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A New Look at Rail Employee
Merger Protection, Norfolk & Western
R.R. v. Nemitz: An Assessment
Thomas 1. Murray, Jr.
The livelihoods of employees of merging railroads are afforded spe-
cial statutory protection in the Interstate Commerce Act. The author
surveys the development of employee "protective conditions" and then
assesses Norfolk & Western R.R. v. Nemitz, 404 U.S. 37 (1971), in
which the Supreme Court recently expanded the scope of Interstate Com-
merce Commission responsibilities and the jurisdiction of the federal
courts over employee grievances arising from railroad mergers. The
article includes an extended analysis of the development of the exhaustion
of remedies rule up to recent Supreme Court pronouncements. The
author concludes that although the Court failed to face important ex-
haustion of remedies questions, the decision affords needed employee
protection which is substantially more valuable than the costs of any
possible resulting increase in government interference in collective
bargaining and grievance procedures.
I. INTRODUCTION
A ERGERS AND CONSOLIDATIONS, important in American
enterprise since the 1920's, are commonplace today.' The
phenomenon has been prevalent in the transportation industry,
which has sought to eliminate costly duplication of facilities through
a series of major consolidations.
The resulting contraction of fa-THE, AUtHoR: THOMrAS J. MtURR , cilities has, however, posed sub-
JR. (B.A., Boston College; J.D., Univer-
sity of Virginia) is a practicing attorney stantial threats to the job secu-
in Sandusky, Ohio, and a member of the rity of thousands of railway
Ohio, Federal, and Supreme Court Bars.
Mr. Murray was counsel for the aggrieved employees.
railroad union members throughout the These threats, inherent in
litigation of Norfolk & Western R.R. v. mergers, have not gone unno-Nemitz, 404 U.S. 37 (1971). mres aentgn noticed in Congress, which has en-
acted section 5 of the Inter-
state Commerce Act (ICA)' in an effort to protect threatened carrier
1 See Alexander, Conglomerates, Mergers, and Collective Bargaining, 24 IND. &
LAB. REL. REV. 354 (1971); Morton, Carrier Consolidation, 30 ICC PRAC. J. 425
(1963); Symposium, Conglomerates and Other Modern Merger Movements, 25 Bus.
LAW. 555 (1969); Note, Railroad Consolidation: A Diseconomic Panecea, 56 IowA
L REV. 362 (1970).
249 U.S.C. § 5(2) (1970). Non-transportation businesses are for the most part
governed by antitrust laws enforced by the Department of Justice, Federal Trade Corn-
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:103
employees. Under the ICA, approval of the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) is a prerequisite to the merger' of two or more
carriers. Railroad employees are afforded special protections in sec-
tion 5(2) (f ),' which imposes affirmative protective duties on the
ICC and makes the federal courts readily available to railroad em-
ployees. The nature of this protection has recently been clarified
and strengthened in Norfolk & Western R.R. v. Nemitz,5 handed
down by a sharply divided Supreme Court.
Nemitz squarely presented the Court with important questions of
first impression respecting both the scope of the ICC's duties under
the ICA to protect the interests of rail employees against the adverse
effects of rail mergers, and the scope of federal court jurisdiction
over actions by rail employees to enforce rights to merger protec-
tion. In Nemitz, the Court broadened the statutory duties of the
ICC, expanded the enforcement range of federal court jurisdiction,
and limited the powers of rail unions and carriers to alter statutory
norms of protection provided in the ICA. The case presents an ex-
cellent framework for tracing the history and evaluating the effec-
tiveness of one of the nation's most advanced systems for easing the
impact of corporate consolidations on displaced employees.
After a brief review of the historical role of collective bargain-
ing in the formation of employee merger protection and of the ad-
ministrative and decisional history of section 5(2)(f), this article
examines the Nemitz decision in some depth. It considers the prac-
tical implications of the Court's ruling, including its shortcomings
in light of recent developments in the exhaustion of remedies rule.
Finally, it attempts to assess the decision's importance within the
framework of emerging federal labor law policy.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AS A SOURCE OF RAIL EMPLOYEE
MERGER PROTECTION
In the railroad industry, employee merger protection - gener-
ally called "protective conditions" - has historically been the prod-
uct of both collective bargaining and legislation. The first direct
mission and private parties. The principle governing statute is § 7 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
3 The term "merger" is used in this article to describe various consolidations of rail-
road facilities including mergers, acquisitions, leases, and control agreements within the
purview of the legislation which is the subject of this paper.
4 The full text of § 5 (2) (f) is printed at note 14 infra.
5 404 U.S. 37 (1971).
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Congressional enactment of rail employee merger protection was
contained within the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of
1933.0 That Act contemplated extensive railroad consolidations as
a means of strengthening the depression-weakened financial condi-
tion of the railroad industry. It provided for a mandatory job freeze
and compensation protection for all employees on railroad payrolls
in May, 1933.' During its three-year existence, however, the Act
brought about little railroad consolidation and still less improvement
in the condition of the railroad industry.8
On February 1, 1936, after efforts to secure voluntary action had
failed, the Federal Coordinator of Transportation announced that
he would shortly order unification in twelve different railroad termi-
nals.9 The proposed order aroused concern among both carriers
and unions. Carriers threatened court action to challenge the Co-
ordinator's authority; the unions sought legislation to prevent any
reduction in railroad employment. Negotiations ensued after Presi-
dent Roosevelt urged both sides to settle their differences through
collective bargaining, and on May 21, 1936, an agreement was signed
in Washington, D.C.10 This agreement, generally known in the in-
dustry as the Washington Agreement, bound 85 percent of the rail-
roads and 21 railroad labor organizations, and remains fundamental
to virtually all railroad employee protective arrangements - those
collectively agreed upon as well as those prescribed by the ICC."
The Washington Agreement provides that economic protection
be furnished by the railroads to employees who may be displaced,
dismissed, or transferred as a result of consolidations. Basically,
an employee placed in a lower-paying job is entitled to receive a
monthly "displacement allowance" to maintain his earnings at the
level of his former position for five years following coordination.
Employees who are temporarily or permanently deprived of employ-
ment are paid a "coordination allowance" equal to 60 percent of
their average monthly compensation for the preceeding 12 months of
6 Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 91, 48 Stat. 211.
7Id. § 7.
8 See generally E. LATHAM, THE POLITICS OF RAILROAD COORDINATION 1933-
1936 (1959).
9 Id. at 244-45.
10 The Washington Agreement is described in Railway Labor Ass'n v. United States,
339 U.S. 142, 147 n.7 (1950), and is published in Hearings on H.R. 2531 Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess., at 231-41 (1939) [hereinafter cited as 1939 Hearings].
"1THE BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN, MANUAL OF INFORMATION
AND INSTRUCTIONS, pt. 1, at 150-52 (1962).
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service, for periods up to five years, depending upon the length of
service."
When the condition of the railroad industry showed little sign
of improving, President Roosevelt, in 1938, appointed a committee
consisting of three railroad executives and three representatives of
railway labor ["The Committee of Six"] to recommend legislation.
In 1940, with approximately one-third of the country's railroad
mileage in bankruptcy,"5 Congress added section 5 (2) (f) to the In-
terstate Commerce Act, 4 the present statutory foundation for pro-
tecting persons employed by merging railway carriers.
The first sentence of section 5(2) (f) provides that: "[a]s a con-
dition of its approval [of a rail merger] . . . the Commission shall
require a fair and equitable arrangement to protect the interests of
the railroad employees affected." The second sentence provides that
the order of approval "shall include" certain minimum employee pro-
tective conditions - protection for at least four years against "being
in a worse position with respect to their employment...." The
third and final sentence, which deals with the role of collective bar-
gaining in solving merger related problems, states that "[n]otwith-
standing any other provisions of this act, an agreement pertaining
to the protection of the interests of said employees may hereafter
be entered into" between the carrier and its employees' representa-
tives.
The first important test of the scope of the ICC's duties and
121d. See 1939 Hearings, supra note 10; Hummer, Jr., Projection of Employees
Affected by Railroad Consolidations, 15 LAB. L.J. 736, 739 (1964).
18 See 86 CONG. REc. 10184 (1940); Lasdon, The Evolution of Railroad Reorga-
nization, 39 ICC PRAc. J. 540 (1972). For additional discussion of the early history of
employee protection see S. Doc. No. 77, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); L. LECIT, EX-
PERIENCE UNDER RAILWAY LABOR LEGISLATION, ch. VII (1955).
14 49 U.S.C. § 5(2)(f) (1970) states that:
[als a condition of its approval, under this paragraph, of any transaction in-
volving a carrier or carriers by railroad subject to the provisions of this chap-
ter, the Commission shall require a fair and equitable arrangement to pro-
tect the interests of the railroad employees affected. In its order of approval the
Commission shall include terms and conditions providing that during the
period of four years from the effective date of such order such transaction will
not result in employees of the carrier or carriers by railroad affected by such
order being in a worse position with respect to their employment, except that
the protection afforded to any employee pursuant to this sentence shall not be
required to continue for a longer period, following the effective date of such
order, than the period during which such employee was in the employ of such
carrier or carriers prior to the effective date of such order. Notwithstanding
any other provisions of this Act, an agreement pertaining to the protection of
the interests of said employees may hereafter be entered into by any carrier or
carriers by railroad and the duly authorized representative or representatives
of its or their employees.
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powers under section 5(2) (f) came in New Orleans Union Passen-
ger Terminal.5 In that case the ICC took the position that the sec-
ond sentence of section 5 (2) (f) prescribed a limitation of a "period
of four years from the effective date of such order" on the first sen-
tence requirement of "a fair and equitable arrangement to protect
the interests of railroad employees affected." This interpretation
would have limited protection to four years from the effective date
of ICC approval, rather than four years from the time the employee
became adversely affected. Since the practical problems of imple-
menting mergers often delay the impact of consolidation on em-
ployees, the ICC's position would, in many cases, have shortened
the period of protection to less than four years.
On appeal the Supreme Court disagreed with the ICC's interpre-
tation and reversed New Orleans under the name Railway Labor
Executives Ass'n v. United States.'" The Court held that:
[T]he Commission, while required to observe the provisions of the
second sentence of § 5(2) (f) as a minimum protection for em-
ployees adversely affected, is not confined to the four-year protective
period as a statutory maximum. The Commission has the power to
require a fair and equitable arrangement to protect the interests of
railroad employees beyond four years from the effective date of the
order approving the consolidation.' 7
Railway Labor Ass'n thus establishes a mandatory four-year duration
of protection, and allows the ICC to impose protection in excess of
four years where appropriate.
The next test of the ICC's responsibilities under section 5 (2) (f)
came in 1960 in Erie-Lackawanna Merger.'8 In that case employees
contended that the second sentence requirement of section 5 (2) (f),
dictating that employees were not to be "placed in a worse position
with respect to their employment," required a "job freeze" - guar-
anteed employment for a period of four years from the date of ad-
verse effect - rather than the past practice of awarding monetary
compensation.' The ICC rejected the employees' position on the
ground that monetary compensation was sufficient to satisfy the re-
quirements of the second sentence of section 5 (2) (f). On appeal
under the name Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v.
United States,"0 the Supreme Court sustained the ICC's position that
IG 267 I.C.C. 763 (1948).
16339 U.S. 142 (1950).
17Id. at 155.
18 312 I.C.C. 185 (1960).
19 Id.
20 366 U.S. 169 (1961).
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the retention of unnecessary positions was unwarranted and that
monetary compensation was sufficient. The Court determined from
the legislative history of the Transportation Act of 19402' that a
"job freeze" was not contemplated by Congress in the enactment of
section 5(2) (f), and further observed that such an interpretation
of the legislative history was reinforced and confirmed by subsequent
events. The Court noted that since the statute's enactment, the
Commission had consistently followed the practice of imposing com-
pensatory protection in over 80 cases with full support of the rail
unions.
2
Railway Labor Ass'n and Maintenance of Way were the only
cases before Nemitz where the Court directly addressed itself to sec-
tion 5(2) (f). And, while the ICC has decided other cases subse-
quent to Railway Labor Ass'n and Maintenance of Way, it is unclear
from administrative practice whether the Commission ever viewed
Railway Labor Ass'n or Maintenance of Way as applicable to mer-
gers that involved prior protective agreements between carriers and
unions. Since there were no pre-merger agreements in either case,
the decisions could not define the scope of the ICC's duties where
such agreements exist.
Pre-merger agreements have historically taken two forms: (1)
stipulations between carriers and unions adopting ICC-developed
protective conditions;2 3 and (2) collective agreements, generally pat-
terned after the ICC's boilerplate conditions.24  A review of ICC
merger orders, however, reflects Commission ambivalence towards its
21 See St. Joe Paper Co. v. Atlantic C. L. R.R., 347 U.S. 298, 315-21 (1953) for a
brief description of the legislative history of the Transportation Act of 1940.
.22 366 U.S. 169, 177 (1961). To meet the statutory requirements of section 5(2)(f),
the ICC has used the Washington Agreement in developing a paradigm of protective
conditions. The first such set of conditions was prescribed in Oklahoma Ry. Trustees
Abandonment of Operation, 257 I.C.C. 177 (1944), and became known as the Okla-
homa Conditions. The Washington Agreement was used as a pattern for the Oklahoma
Conditions but the Commission recognized that the maximum Washington Agreement
benefits - 60 percent of annual compensation for five years - was less than the statu-
tory protection required by § 5(2)(f). The Oklahoma Conditions prescribed 100 per-
cent protection; however, that protection was available only for a maximum period of
four years. As discussed earlier, the Commission's "four year" policy was reversed by
the Supreme Court in Railway Labor Ass'n. On remand, the ICC amended the Okla-
homa Conditions in the second New Orleans Passenger Terminal Case, 282 I.C.C. 271
(1952), by combining the Washington Agreement with the Oklahoma Conditions to
form a statutory minimum. The resulting conditions became known as the New Or-
leans Conditions, and it was these conditions which were upheld in Maintenance of Way.
Since Maintenance of Way the ICC has, in cases where it has prescribed protective
terms, with slight modification adhered to the New Orleans Conditions.
2 3BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN, supra note 11, at 150-52.
24 Id. at 150.
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statutory duties where protective agreements have been reached. In
some cases, the Commission has unequivocally imposed such condi-
tions for the protection of the union members." In other cases, the
Commission has adopted agreed-upon conditions for employees
whose unions signed such agreements, even though it believed that
different protection should be imposed for employees not covered by
the agreements.26 In still other cases, the Commission has held that
"as to employees covered by the aforementioned agreements, no
conditions to our order are necessary," and has prescribed a set of
conditions only for employees "not protected by the foregoing stipu-
lations and agreements." 27
Past Commission practice would then seem to fall into three cate-
gories: (1) approval and adoption of prior agreements as part of
its merger approval order; (2) approval of the terms of prior agree-
ments without adopting such terms as part of its order; (3) mere
recognition of prior agreements as relieving the Commission of any
duty to prescribe protection without including such conditions in its
order. Until Nemitz, it was unclear whether any or all of these
practices reflected a proper exercise of ICC responsibilities under sec-
tion 5(2) (f).
The question left unresolved can be briefly stated as follows:
Does the Commission have a statutory duty to assure a minimal level
of employee protection where protective agreements are reached
prior to merger? While this question may seem to pose a rather
narrow and technical problem of statutory construction, in reality it
raises far-reaching and perplexing problems in rail merger protection.
Must the ICC review the adequacy of protective agreements made
pursuant to the last sentence of section 5 (2) (f), and if so, must it
incorporate such agreements as part of its approval order? Can ICC
review of agreements be accomplished without doing violence to the
strong federal labor policy against governmental interference with
the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements ?28 By
what standard should protective agreements be measured by the ICC
and to what extent may protective agreements be altered through
25 Delaware, L. & W. R.R Trackage Rights, 295 I.C.C. 743 (1958); Erie R.R.
Trackage Rights, 295 I.C.C. 303 (1956); Gulf, M. & 0. R.R. Purchase, 261 I.C.C. 405,
434 (1945).
2 6 Valdosta Southern R.R. Purchase, 282 I.C.C. 705, 711-12 (1952); Detroit, T.
& I. R.R. Control, 275 I.C.C. 455, 487 (1950); Pere Marquette Ry. Merger, 267 I.C.C.
207, 235 (1947); Wheeling & L. E. Ry. Control, 267 I.C.C. 163, 184 (1946).
27 Chicago & N.W. Ry. Purchase, 312 I.C.C. 285, 296 (1960); Norfolk & W. Ry.
Merger, 307 I.C.C. 401, 439 (1959).
28 See Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971).
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collective bargaining subsequent to mergers? Conversely, if the
ICC is relieved of statutory duties where protective agreements are
executed, what law governs actions to enforce such agreements? If
protective agreements are treated as standard Railway Labor Act
(RLA) contracts, how is frustration of the manifest policies of the
ICA to be avoided in the face of various restraints placed upon car-
riers and employees under the RLA? To what extent does the ex-
haustion of remedies doctrine limit employee access to federal court
enforcement of merger rights? These and related questions, which
at bottom pivot upon the interpretation of the "notwithstanding"
sentence of section 5(2) (f), confronted the court in Norfolk &
Western Ry. v. Nemitz.
III. THE NEMITZ DECISION
While Nemitz did not appear in the courts until 1968,29 the case
had its origin four years earlier in the aftermath of one of the na-
tion's largest rail consolidations. 30 In 1964, as part of the transaction
which merged the systems of the N & W and Nickel Plate Rail-
roads, 31 N & W acquired from the Pennsylvania Railroad the so-
called Sandusky line, a seasonal line operating when Lake Erie was
open to navigation. 2 Shortly after its application for approval of
the merger was filed with the ICC,3  N & W entered into an em-
ployee protection agreement with the Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men (BRT), a labor organization representing employees of the
carriers involved. This agreement was made pursuant to the third
sentence of section 5 (2) (f). Under its terms, employees previously
employed on the Sandusky line were offered the option of continu-
ing with the Pennsylvania Railroad or working for the N & W on
the newly purchased Sandusky line. The agreement promised em-
ployees electing Sandusky line employment monthly supplementary
compensation to the extent that their post-merger monthly earnings
were less than their average earnings for the 12 months immediate-
ly preceding the merger.
2 9 Nemitz v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 287 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
30 Norfolk & W. Ry. and New York, C. & St. L. R.R. Merger, 324 I.C.C. 1 (1964).
31id.
3 2 The Sandusky line was pivotal to the merger plan since it represented the final
north-south link in the N & W's consolidation of trackage acquired from the Nickel
Plate and Pennsylvania Railroads. Helmetag, Jr., Railroad Mergers: The Accommoda-
tion of the Interstate Commerce Act and Antitrust Policies, 54 VA. L. REV. 1493, 1512
(1968).
33 Filed on March 17, 1961. Nemitz v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 287 F. Supp. 221, 223
(N.D. Ohio 1968).
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In approving the merger,34 the ICC stated that the agreements re-
specting employee protection were "made pursuant to and in com-
formity with section 5(2) (f) of the Interstate Commerce Act for
the protection of the covered employees," and made its order "sub-
ject to such agreements." 5 After the merger went into effect, N &
W claimed difficulty in obtaining pre-merger earnings records from
Pennsylvania for work done beyond the Sandusky line and conse-
quently it entered into a post-merger agreement with the BRT limit-
ing supplementary compensation to the earnings level for the pre-
ceeding 12 months from the Sandusky line only. 6 This limitation
drastically reduced monetary protection promised by the pre-merger
agreement to those employees who, because the Sandusky line work
was seasonal, had earned a large portion of their yearly income on
other parts of their former employer's railroad system.
When the union, which had made the agreement with the car-
rier to reduce merger benefits, refused to process their claim against
the railroad, the aggrieved employees brought a class action in the
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Ohio seeking re-
lief from the post-merger agreement and claiming as damages the
amount unpaid under the terms of the pre-merger agreement. The
defendant carrier, contending that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, moved for dismissal of the action. This motion was
denied, however, on the ground that the court had jurisdiction to
enforce an ICC order."' Thereafter, the carrier, in support of a
motion for summary judgment, advanced two additional arguments
against federal court jurisdiction over the case: (1) since plaintiffs
claimed that they were aggrieved by the subsequent agreement, the
court had no jurisdiction over a dispute arising ouf of that agree-
ment even if the prior agreement were deemed part of the Commis-
sion's order; and (2) the failure of the employees to exhaust admin-
istrative remedies under both the RLA and the agreement barred
federal court intervention in the dispute. The carrier's motion was
denied, but the court granted the cross-motion of the employees for
summary judgment.38 The court held that the post-merger agree-
ment was unenforceable because it abrogated the level of protection
34 Approval was given by the ICC on June 24, 1964. Nemitz v. Norfolk & W.
Ry., 287 F. Supp. 221,223 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
35 Norfolk & W. Ry. and New York, C. & St. L. R.R. Merger, 324 I.C.C. 1, 50
(1971).
3 6 Norfolk & W. R.R. v. Nemitz, 404 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).
37 Nemitz v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 287 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
38 Nemitz v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 309 F. Supp. 575 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
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contained in the Commission-adopted prior agreement as required
by section 5(2) (f), and, although the court had ruled in denying
defendant's jurisdictional motion that the employees were not
barred by any failure to exhaust administrative remedies,3 9 it never-
theless remanded the case to arbitration under the pre-merger agree-
ment to determine damages.40
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals essentially affirmed the dis-
trict court's ruling but modified it by requiring that damages be de-
termined by the lower court pursuant to sections 8 and 9 of the Inter-
state Commerce Act.41 The court agreed with the district court that
the ICC faces a continuing obligation to assure a minimal statutory
level of protection despite the existence of any prior voluntary agree-
ments. In response to the carrier's contention that the existence of a
protective agreement relieved the ICC of responsibility for employee
merger protection the court stated that:
[t]he existence of a prior agreement does not allow the ICC to ig-
nore its statutory duty. On the contrary, the ICC is required .. to
impose employee protective conditions whether derived from an
agreement or independently formulated by the ICC .... We find
that the 1964 order by disclaiming the necessity for protective con-
ditions, must be construed as meaning that such conditions need
not be spelled out or elaborated in the 1964 order since they were
sufficiently covered by the 1962 agreement, a construction which is
consistent with the theory of incorporation as well as with the
ICC's statutory duty.42
The appellate court also agreed that the post-merger agreement was
unenforceable in that "fain agreement made pursuant to the last
sentence of section 5(2) (f) may vary the protections afforded by
the ICC order, but it may not substantially abrogate employee's
rights grounded by an ICC order."4 Finally, the court adopted the
lower court's finding that the employees were not barred by any
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.44
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the ICC and the
United States Solicitor General vigorously argued in an amicus brief
39 The court noted that the employees had been frustrated by the union in their at-
tempt to utilize union remedies and that the doctrine of exhaustion presupposes ade-
quate remedies. It then concluded that the arbitration provision in the agreements
was "permissive," and since neither the union nor the carrier had invoked arbitration,
that the remedy was not required. 287 F. Supp. at 230.
40 309 F. Supp. at 585.
41 Nemitz v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 436 F.2d 841, 850 (6th Cir. 1971).
42 Id. at 846.
43 Id. at 848.
44 Id. at 848-50.
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that the "notwithstanding" provision of section 5(2) (f) relieved
the Commission of any duty to review the adequacy of the protec-
tive provisions contained in a pre-merger collective bargaining
agreement and that the employees, therefore, were not protected by
the ICC's merger-authorizing order." The Court rejected the ICC's
position on the prior voluntary agreements and affirmed the deci-
sion of the court of appeals.
Writing for the majority,4" Justice Douglas concluded that pre-
merger collective agreements do not remove the statutory obligation
of action from the ICC. On the contrary, the ICC must provide
protection for the interests of employees affected by railroad consoli-
dations whether that mandatory protection is "accorded by terms
provided by the Commission, or, as is more likely, by provisions of
a collective agreement which the Commission adopts or approves
as adequate for a minimum of four years (as required by the second
sentence) or longer (as allowed by the first sentence) if the Com-
mission so provides. '47  As to the effect of the "notwithstanding"
clause on the ICC's statutory duties under section 5(2) (f), the
Court reasoned that:
When there is a collective agreement and the Commission, as
here, adopts or approves it, the "notwithstanding" sentence of §
5(2) (f) is not, as suggested, read out of the Act. The collective
agreement then becomes a "condition" of the Commission's "ap-
proval" of the consolidation under the first sentence of § 5(2) (f)
and its provisions are deemed by the Commission to be "a fair and
equitable arrangement to protect the interests" of the employees
within the meaning of the first sentence. Thus the significance of
the "notwithstanding" proviso is that it provides the machinery for
the terms of a pre-merger collective agreement and thus supplies
the minimum measure of fairness required under the first sentence
of § 5 (2) (f).48
On the surface at least the Court's reasoning seems to beg the
question, since, as the defendant carrier strenuously argued in its
brief urging reconsideration, 49 the ICC explicitly took the position
that it did not "adopt" the pre-merger collective agreement as part
of its authorizing order. The dissent in Nemitz was less sparing of
45 Norfolk &W. R.R. v. Nemitz, 404 U.S. 37,42 (1971).
46 The Court divided four to three, with Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall
joining Justice Douglas. Justice Blackmun wrote the dissent and was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice White.
47404 U.S. at 42.
481d. at 43.
49 Defendant's Petition for Rehearing at 8, Norfolk & W. R.R. v. Nemitz, 404 U.S.
37 (1971).
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its reasons for agreeing with the government's contention that there
was no basis for federal court jurisdiction over the dispute. Joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice White, Justice Blackmun scored
the Court's decision as a "sympathetically imposed judicial cure."5
Justice Blackmun basically advanced three arguments against federal
court jurisdiction. The first argument was based upon statutory
construction: "This plain and unambiguous 'notwithstanding' lan-
guage, obviously and necessarily directed to and affecting only the
two preceeding sentences, requires that an agreement entered into
by the carrier and the collective bargaining representative be con-
trolling. '"51 Thus, reasoned the dissent, the first two sentences of
section 5 (2) (f) should apply only in the absence of a prior volun-
tary agreement, and the ICC should be required to act only where
the parties are unable to reach an agreement prior to merger.
Secondly, the dissent viewed the Court's decision as contrary to
the legislative intent behind section 5 (2) (f). To Justice Blackmun,
this legislative history evinced "a clear and positive intent on the
part of the authors of this legislation to make appropriate provision
for employee protection, but explicitly to withdraw Commission-
dictated protection whenever the carrier and the union, before mer-
ger, voluntarily arrive at protective provisions satisfactory to them."5 2
Finally, the dissent contended that the position of the majority
would have an adverse effect on free collective bargaining. 3
IV. NEMITZ: AN ASSESSMENT
The reasoning of the dissenters may, superficially at least, seem
more compelling than the somewhat conclusionary opinion of the
Court. And though we might agree with Judge Magruder's sympa-
thetic dictum that superficial analysis in Supreme Court opinions
reflects "the very necessities and pressures under which the Supreme
Court has to do its work, ' 54 failure to adequately justify a decision
tends to give rise to uncertainty about its wisdom and to skepticism
about its value as precedent. This is particularly true during a peri-
50 404 U.S. at 45.
51 Id. at 46.
2Id. at 48.
53 "The result reached by the Court appears to me to require the ICC and the courts
always to intrude upon collective bargaining, by reviewing the sufficiency of its substan-
tive product, and thereby to discourage and to downgrade the collective bargaining pro-
cess that has been so firmly established in this area and so steadfastly protected." Id. at
50.
54 Magruder, The Trials and Tribulations of an Intermediate Appellate Court, 49
CORNELL L.Q. 1, 7-8 (1958).
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od in which the Court's philosophical balance is ostensibly shifting,
as was the case in Nemitz. The remainder of this article attempts to
do what those aware of the far-reaching implications of Nemitz
may wish the Court had done. It undertakes to analyze in some
depth the legislative history of section 5 (2) (f) and to measure the
effects of the Court's decision on the exercise of ICC responsibilities
under that section and on the processes of collective bargaining, both
at pre-merger and post-merger stages. Then, it takes an overview
of the decision's impact on federal labor policy, with particular em-
phasis placed upon the exhaustion of administrative remedies ques-
tion.
A. The Legislative History of Section 5(2)(f)
As indicated previously,5 the Washington Agreement of 1936
had little apparent effect in stimulating needed mergers. In early
1939, Congress began consideration of legislation, along the lines
recommended by President Roosevelt's Committee of Six, which
eventually led to the Transportation Act of 1940 and to section
5 (2) (f) of the Interstate Commerce Act. The bill initially consid-
ered by the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce5"
contained no provision for the protection of workers affected by
rail consolidations. The Committee of Six, however, recommended
a provision that would require the Commission to demand, "as a
prerequisite of its approval, a fair and equitable arrangement to pro-
tect the interests" of affected employees.57 The bill introduced and
passed in the Senate, contained the provision regarding a "fair and
equitable arrangement" which the Committee of Six had recom-
mended.5 8  The bill introduced in the House contained a similar
provision,59 but Representative Vincent F. Harrington succeeded in
amending the House bill to include a directive that the Commission
approve no transaction "if such transaction will result in unemploy-
ment or displacement of employees of the carrier or carriers, or in
the impairment of existing employment rights of said employees.""
The Conference Committee, however, eliminated both the Harring-
ton amendment and the "fair and equitable" language.6 1 The House
55 See note 10 supra & accompanying text.
561939 Hearings, supra note 10.
57 Id. at 275.
58 84 CONG. REc. 6158 (1939).
59 See H.R. REP. No. 1217, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1939).
60 84 CONG. REc. 9882 (1939).
6 1 H.R. REP. No. 2016, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 61 (1940).
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voted to recommit with instructions to the House managers to re-
store the "fair and equitable" language and to insist on a revised
version of the Harrington amendment. The second conference re-
ported section 5 (2) (f) in the final form in which it was enacted into
law. It retained the original language of the first sentence. In the
second sentence, however, the Committee included a substantial
change in the Harrington proposal. It limited ICC protection to the
four years following the effective date of the Commission's order of
approval. It provided also that in each case the protective period
was not to exceed the length of each employee's employment by a
carrier prior to the effective date of the Commission's order of ap-
proval. The House also inserted the "notwithstanding" clause -
the last sentence of section 5(2) (f).
Significantly, the debate on the final version of section 5 (2) (f)
never focused directly on the relationship between the "notwith-
standing" clause of the third sentence and the first two sentences of
the section. Congressman Harrington, an advocate of compulsory
employee protection, described the third sentence as permitting "the
industry, through the processes of collective bargaining, to work out
its problems in a democratic manner.16 2 Congressman Clarence F.
Lea referred to the "notwithstanding" sentence as "a provision con-
firming the right of employees to enter into agreements with rail-
roads to take care of them in case of unemployment as a result of
consolidations. 63
It seems difficult to discern in this legislative history, as did the
Nemitz dissenters, "a clear and positive intent" to relieve the Com-
mission of all duties to assure fair and equitable protective conditions
for railroad employees whenever carriers and unions, before merger,
"voluntarily arrive at protective provisions satisfactory to them."6
An equally plausible inference to be drawn from this legislative his-
tory is that Congress, by limiting the scope of the Harrington
amendment to four years of compulsory protection in the second
sentence, thereby intended to blunt the deterrent effect which that
amendment, like the similar proviso in the 1933 Emergency Act,
65
would have had on railroad mergers. The modified Harrington
amendment thus strikes a balance between the extremes of compul-
sory lifetime protection against unemployment - a job freeze - as
6286 CONG. REC. 5871 (1940).
631d, at 10178.
64 Norfolk & W. R.R. v. Nemitz, 404 U.S. at 48.
65 Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 91, § 7, 48 Stat. 211.
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provided in the precursor 1933 Act, and a total absence of any con-
gressionally-mandated protection as proposed in the bill initially
considered by the House Committee on Interstate or Foreign Com-
merce.
6 6
In short, it seems fair to say that so far as the legislative history
of section 5 (2) (f) is concerned, the signposts of congressional in-
tent respecting the effect of the "notwithstanding" sentence are at
best unclear. It is the author's view that the probable intent of Con-
gress, and the wisdom of the Nemitz decision, emerge only when
the practical ramifications of mergers are considered in light of the
policy objectives underlying the legislation in question.
B. The Practical Effects of Nemitz on Collective Bargaining
as a Source of Employee Merger Protection
The standard set up by the statute is not a rule of law; it is rather
a way of life. Life in all its fullness must supply the answer to
the riddle.
Mr. Justice Cardozo 67
The constellation of interests having a stake in labor disputes
is not fixed. The relative weight to be accorded such interests, the
nature of the protections which they require, and the relationships
between them vary markedly from situation to situation. The par-
ties affected by a collective bargaining agreement are employer,
union, and many individual employees. Employee interests can be
frustrated in several ways, as where there is a claim that some are
being permitted to deprive others of work by doing jobs outside of
their own classification, or where group interests conflict with the
claims of individuals because some have divergent interests, because
the demands of group organization and coherence clash with indi-
vidual self-interest, or because union officialdom is unresponsive to
the wishes of a numerical minority of the members. The law has had
trouble with the tripartite relationships in the complicated and shift-
ing context of the labor field.68  Part of that trouble has resulted
from a tendency to substitute abstract analysis for the harder but
necessary process of identifying and balancing interests, in the con-
text of the language and purposes of relevant statutes. The princi-
ples determining legal rights and duties under a collective bargaining
6 6 See 1939 Hearings, supra note 10.
67 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
6 8 Some experienced observers have suggested that the law should stay out of the
autonomous system of industrial self-government. See, e.g., Shulman, Reason, Con-
tract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REV. 999, 1001-02, 1024 (1955).
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agreement dealing with the sensitive problem of merger protection
should not be proclaimed ex cathedra; the principles should instead
derive from knowledge of practical realities and be shaped to the
needs of the institutions. A careful analysis of its thrust will reveal
that the Nemitz decision accomplishes this end.
A proper assessment of the practical effects of Nemitz on collec-
tive bargaining as a means of solving merger-related problems re-
quires asking appropriate questions at the outset. If the focus of in-
quiry is limited to determining whether ICC review of the product
of pre-merger collective bargaining will in some cases affect that
process, Justice Blackmun's negative view of the result reached in
Nemitz may seem appropriate. If, however, the spotlight of in-
quiry is aimed at determining whether the degree of intrusion re-
quired by Nemitz is justified by the practical results of review, a
different picture emerges. An initial distinction should be drawn
between the legislative process of negotiating protective agreements,
and the process of enforcing such agreements after merger approval.
1. The Negotiation Stage.- Pre-merger collective bargaining
generally falls into two categories: that directed at hammering out
a variety of terms and conditions designed to, facilitate consolidation,
and that dealing with the problem of providing merger protection
for employees who will be adversely affected. The first category
basically involves three problems: adjusting the work equities among
the employees of the merged system;69 delineating the schedule of
rules and working conditions which will apply to the merged sys-
tem;7" and merging the pre-existing seniority rosters.71 Resolution
of these problems is clearly necessary to assure the orderly transi-
tion to a consolidated operation. Leaving to the union the function
of negotiating transitional rules and working conditions is mani-
festly in the interest of individual employees; they are the inciden-
tal beneficiaries of this function. While an individual may not con-
cur with all that is agreed to by his union, terms and conditions
arrived at will, generally, apply uniformly throughout the merged
system. Employees most drastically affected by a consolidation will,
if they are able to retain their jobs, share the benefits and burdens
69 For a discussion of the provisions in this category in the Nemitz case, see 404
U.S. at 44 n.5.
70 Generally the parties of these agreements agree to adopt the schedule rules of the
predominant carrier, modified or augmented where necessary to accommodate the prob-
lems of transition.
71 A typical example of provisions in this category were those involved in Brother-
hood of Locomotive Engineers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 314 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1963).
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of agreed-upon rules and working conditions in similar measure
with employees less severely affected by the merger. Moreover, any
risk of subtle discrimination against politically vulnerable employ-
ees in the formation of transitional work rules is compensated for
by assuring that employee merger protection remains effectively im-
munized from discriminatory action. An employee, for example,
whose work opportunities are lessened because of discriminatory al-
location of work equities on the merged system will be protected to
the extent of his pre-merger earnings level against the effects of this
discrimination. Thus there is no good reason for not leaving to the
unreviewable processes of collective bargaining the task of estab-
lishing transitional rules and working conditions. 72  Nor, it is sub-
mitted, is there anything in the Nemitz holding, or in any other case
interpreting section 5 (2) (f), which requires a contrary result.
The matter of basic employee merger protection, however, poses
quite a different problem. From the viewpoint of the individual
employee, there are grave risks in giving his bargaining representa-
tive untrammeled control over the formation of protection against
the adverse effects of consolidation. The employee whose job is to
be eliminated by merger and who lacks sufficient seniority to hold
work on the merged system73 has a peculiarly personal interest in
obtaining merger protection which is different in kind from his inter-
est in the outcome of negotiations respecting transitional work rules.
An employee whose job is eliminated will obviously have little cause
to worry about work rules, but considerable cause for concern about
the protection he is to receive as a result of displacement. Moreover,
the more drastic the effect of the merger on his employment the
greater will such an employee's interests tend to diverge from those
of the union. Consolidation may cause drastic realignment within
72 There is a gray area between this category and the matter of establishing a for-
mula for calculating basic merger benefits which has to do with defining the causes of
post-merger wage reductions. The agreements in Nemitz, for example, excluded sea-
sonal furlough or decline in revenue on the merged system as possible basis for entitle-
ment to merger benefits. The problem is a tough one. On the one hand, it is arguably
unfair to require carriers to protect employee wages against causes other than the mer-
ger. On the other hand, the protective purposes of the Act might be seriously under-
mined were employees always required to prove that post-merger earnings reductions
were caused by the consolidation. In Nemitz, the district court, at least, indicated that
furre attempts to contractually except certain causes as a basis for merger benefits
might not be sustained by the courts. Nemit v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 309 F. Supp. 575,
583 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
73 Such was the case in Nemitz. The merger had split the employees' seniority dis-
trict so that they were no longer able to hold work in other terminals when the winter
freeze shut down operations at Sandusky, Ohio. The drastic impact which this had on
employee earnings is discussed by the Supreme Court, 404 U.S. at 44.
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the union's political structure, thereby weakening the political influ-
ence of the most vulnerable employees. Even if this does not oc-
cur, the out-of-work employee's influence is reduced because he is no
longer part of the visible constituency to which the union's leader-
ship is daily accountable. As a result, the union leadership may
experience a not inconsiderable temptation to engage in "horse trad-
ing" in which basic financial protection for a displaced and politi-
cally weak employee minority might be relinquished for a conces-
sion by the carrier - for example, a rule change - which benefits
the numerical majority of union members whose jobs are not threat-
ened by consolidation.74
The Nemitz decision is aimed at preventing such compromises
and implicitly limits the responsibilities of the ICC to assuring that
a pre-merger protective agreement contains a minimum of four
years of compensation protection as required by the second sentence
of section 5 (2) (f). Nothing in the holding suggests that the ICC
has any duty beyond assuring that all employees caught up in merg-
ers receive the statutory minimum of protection. The decision thus
impliedly succeeds in drawing a rather neat and pragmatically sound
distinction between agreement respecting basic merger protection
and the negotiation of transitional rules and conditions necessary to
implement consolidations. As to the latter, Nemitz impliedly rec-
ognizes that Commission review of these terms is neither necessary
nor desirable. Moreover, since negotiations respecting basic merger
protection will take place in a context which presupposes compli-
ance with the congressionally-mandated minimum protection, there
should be little likelihood that overt Commission interference with
the processes of collective bargaining will be necessary. Collective
bargaining is thereby left free to operate subject only to the limita-
tion that its product meet the protective standards of section
5(2)(f).
2. The Enforcement Stage.- The ICA provides three remedies
for violation of ICC orders: injunctive relief under section
16(12) ;75 damages under section 9;7" and attorney's fees and costs
under section 8.71 From the employees' point of view, the result
urged by the dissent in Nemitz would foreclose the enforcement
74 The employees in Nemitz alleged that they had been the victims of such discrim-
ination, and the district court indicated its apparent agreement with these allegations.
287 F. Supp. at 231.
7549 U.S.C. § 16(12) (1970).
761d. § 9.
771d. § 8.
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machinery of the ICA to employees whose rights to merger protec-
tion derived from third sentence collective agreements. The ration-
ale of the Nemitz dissent is that these remedies should be available
to employees protected by ICC-imposed merger conditions, but that
employees whose protection derives from collective agreements
should be relegated to the remedial procedures of the RLA or, where
such remedy is provided, to arbitration under the contract. Arbitra-
tion as an alternative to judicial enforcement is considered below,
after an assessment is made of the potential consequences of leaving
enforcement to the procedures of the RLA.
a. The Railway Labor Act as a Possible Basis for Enforcing
Employee Merger Protection.- The RLA provides specific treatment
for collective bargaining problems of the railroad industry. The
Act expresses a policy of freedom of organization and association
for employees and provides a mechanism for the settlement of dis-
putes.78 The Act is, however, administered in two significantly dif-
ferent ways by two separate boards. The National Railroad Adjust-
ment Board (NRAB), the decisions of which are binding upon the
parties and judicially enforceable, considers grievances growing out
of interpretations or applications of existing labor-management agree-
ments. Disputes in this category are referred to as "minor" dis-
putes.79  The National Mediation Board (NMB) provides proce-
dures for negotiation, conciliation, mediation, and voluntary arbitra-
tion in disputes growing out of collective agreement formation. The
parties are required to submit to these procedures but are not bound
by any determination unless they have elected to submit to arbitra-
tion.80 If the parties exhaust these procedures without having
reached agreement, they are free to resort to self-help remedies, that
is, unilateral imposition of proposed changes by the railroad or strike
by the union.
i. Drawbacks of RLA Procedure.- Under the Blackmun ration-
ale, actions by employees to enforce collectively established merger
rights would presumably fall within the category of grievances to be
handled under the minor dispute procedures of the RLA. 81 There
78 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970).
7 9 For a good general discussion of the difference between "major" and "minor" dis-
putes under the RLA see United Transportation Union, Local 63E v. Penn. Cent., 443
F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1971).
80 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1970) establishes the NRAB; 45 U.S.C. § 154 (1970) estab-
lishes the NMB. For a discussion of the differences in jurisdiction of the two boards see
Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-28 (1945).
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are several reasons why the results of such a requirement might
prove undesirable.
First, assuming that a displaced employee's union would be
willing to press his rights against the carrier - a problematical as-
sumption at best8" - final determination by the NRAB might take
several years." Such delay in many grievance cases affords the car-
rier the advantage of being able to submit a dispute and thereby for
all practical purposes defeat the union's demands. Delay in obtain-
ing a final determination by the NRAB, however, is not without its
advantages to unions and carriers in typical grievance cases. For
one thing, it creates a strong incentive for compromising pending
and backlogged grievances. For example, claims of types A and B
may be honored by the carrier in return for concessions by the union
as to types C and D. This "horse trading" spares both the union
and the carrier the time and expense of carrying all grievances to
the Board. It also compels both sides to evaluate continually both
the relative merits and the priorities of pending claims. The end
result is that generally only claims deemed important to the vital
interests of unions and carriers reach the NRAB for decision. As
previously pointed out, however, the inherent tendency to compro-
mise in this protracted process - beneficial to the interests of a
union as an organization and to the railroads - has potentially
disastrous risks for merger-displaced employees. An employee
whose job is eliminated and who is seriously distressed financially
by a merger will find little comfort in the hope of eventual recovery
of promised benefits several years hence. In the meantime, there
would be a real risk that his claim will be watered down or bar-
gained away in the give and take of the grievance process.
Second, the dual remedial systems which would follow from the
Blackmun approach present the potential for unfairness. In many
merger situations there are a number of employees who are not cov-
ered by prior voluntary agreements. 4 As to these employees, the ICC
has consistently imposed protective conditions in accordance with
section 5 (2) (f). It was not disputed in Nemitz that the rights of
81 See Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-28 (1945).
82 In Nemitz, for example, the employees endeavored unsuccessfully for nearly two
years to have their union arbitrate their claims. These efforts are described in Ap-
pendix to record, vol. 1, at 131-50 Norfolk & W. R.R. v. Nemitz, 404 U.S. 37 (1971).
83 For a discussion of this and related problems in proceedings before the board,
see Risher, The Railway Labor Act, 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 51 (1970).
84 In Nemitz, for example, the ICC imposed protective conditions for employees not
covered by the original voluntary agreement executed in 1962. 436 F.2d 846. See
also the mergers cited notes 25-27 supra.
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such employees derive directly from the ICC's approval order. The
result urged by the dissent in Nemitz, therefore, would mean that in
many merger situations different methods of enforcing merger rights
would have to be utilized by these two groups. Those covered by
the voluntary agreement would be required to pursue their remedy
through the labyrinth of the RLA, while parties protected by the ICC
order would be permitted to seek relief directly in federal court.
The latter group of employees would be able to seek rapid injunc-
tive relief and damages, 5 as well as reasonable attorney's fees and
costs.86 Employees whose benefits derived from the agreement
would presumably be permitted to recover damages only, would
probably not have their claim presented by an attorney, 7 and would
have no hope of having the result judicially reviewed. s8 The unfair-
ness of such a dual remedial scheme is obvious.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted in Garner v. Teamsters
Union,9 "a multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures
are quite apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications
as are different rules of substantive law."" While the foregoing
dictum expressed the desirability of preempting state power to es-
tablish substantive principles in conflict with the NLRA and
the necessity for exclusive NLRB jurisdiction as might be re-
quired to accomplish this result, it has considerable relevance to
the problem under discussion. Since the issue in enforcement cases
will be frequently whether or not employees have received contrac-
tually promised merger benefits, a dual scheme of enforcement
would, in some cases, confront the NRAB with the task of deciding
substantive principles governing the level of employee merger pro-
tection. The Nemitz case furnishes an illustration. There, the car-
rier contended that the pre-merger agreement should be interpreted
as limiting protection to the level of pre-merger earnings only on
that portion of the Pennsylvania Railroad's system purchased by N
& W." Since the merger split the employees' seniority district,
this contention directly confronted the district court with a question
of contract interpretation, the resolution of which drastically af-
fected the level of merger benefits to which the employees were en-
8549 U.S.C. §§ 9, 16(12) (1970).
s6id. § 8.
87 Risher, supra note 83.
88 See Gunther v. San Diego & Ariz. E. Ry., 382 U.S. 257 (1965).
89 346 U.S. 485 (1965).
90 Id. at 490-91.
91404 U.S. at 43-44.
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titled. The district court interpreted the contract in light of the re-
quirements of section 5(2) (f) and held that protection of the em-
ployees' entire pre-merger earnings level was required.2
Had the problem of interpreting the prior voluntary agreement
been left to the NRAB, by what standard would the Board have
determined whether the carrier's restrictive interpretation of the prior
voluntary agreement was correct? Would it have applied the stan-
dard of the first two sentences of section 5 (2) (f) as interpreted by
the courts,93 or, since the "notwithstanding" proviso merely states
that agreements pertaining to the protection of the interests of af-
fected employees may be made between unions and carriers, would
the Board be free to fashion its own substantive principles? In
either event, how would it be possible to avoid the development of
conflicting substantive principles - those developed by the NRAB
and those resulting from judicial enforcement of ICC-ordered pro-
tection? The unfairness of permitting operation of parallel but un-
equal enforcement schemes would thus be aggravated by conflicting
substantive adjudications.
ii. The Question of Preemption Under ICA Section 5(11).-
Section 5(11) of the ICA provides that "the authority conferred by
this section shall be exclusive and plenary.' 1 4  In deciding the ju-
risdictional issues, the lower courts in Nemitz viewed section 5(11)
as exempting the parties from the restraints of the RLA as a neces-
sary corollary to the ICC's authority in mergers subject to its approval
under section 5 of the ICA. The courts cited both the legislative
history and decisions interpreting ICC powers under that section in
support of this conclusion. 5 The courts found the case of Brother-
hood of Locomotive Engineers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.9 6 particularly
persuasive. In that case the unions contended that the carrier was
92309 F. Supp. at 583.
93 See text accompanying notes 16-23 supra.
94 49 U.S.C. § 5(11) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
The authority conferred by this section shall be exclusive and plenary... and
any carriers or other corporations, and their officers and employees and any
other persons, participating in a transaction approved or authorized under the
provisions of this section shall be and they are relieved from the operation of
the anti-trust laws and of all other restraints, limitations, and prohibitions of
law, Federal, State, or municipal, insofar as may be necessary to enable them
to carry into effect the transaction so approved or provided for in accordance
with the terms and conditions, if any, imposed by the Commission, and to hold,
maintain, and operate any properties and exercise any control or franchises ac-
quired through such transaction....
9 5 Nemitz v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 309 F. Supp. 575, 580-82 (N.D. Ohio 1969); 436
F.2d 841, 845 (6th Cir. 1971).
96 314 F.2d 424 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 819 (1963).
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required to follow the major dispute procedures of the RLA in ad-
justing seniority rights of employees affected by Commission-ordered
consolidation of railroad yards. The carrier sued for declaratory
judgment requiring the union to arbitrate the dispute under the
terms of a pre-merger stipulation providing for arbitration in the
event of controversy stemming from coordination efforts. This stip-
ulation had been approved by the ICC in much the same language
used in the merger out of which the Nemitz dispute arose. The
Northwestern court held that jurisdiction existed under the ICA to
enforce the arbitration clause which was adopted as part of the ICC's
approval order, and that the railroad was relieved of the require-
ments of the RLA in adjusting seniority rights. The rationale for
the court's ruling was adopted by the court of appeals in Nemitz:
[T]here must be exclusive and plenary authority in the I.C.C. to
achieve the purposes of the Act. The authority vested in the I.C.C.
to effectuate proposed mergers would be rendered ineffective if au-
thority to adjust work realignments through fair compensation did
not exist. Since, under the Railway Labor Act, employees cannot
be compelled to accept or arbitrate new working rules or condi-
tions, the application of the Railway Labor Act to situations such as
that presented here, like the Harrington Amendment, would threat-
en to prevent many consolidations, and, therefore, should not be ap-
plied.97
Had the union's position in Northwestern prevailed, implemen-
tation of the consolidation might have been seriously hampered or
even completely frustrated.98 In the Supreme Court, employees in
Nemitz argued that pre-merger agreements on merger protection and
provisions for arbitration are inseparable parts of pre-merger stipu-
lations; that unless federal court jurisdiction exists to enforce both
terms, the statutory objectives of conferring plenary authority in the
ICC to approve mergers and of assuring employee protection would
be seriously undermined.' Despite these arguments and the lower
court's adoption of the Northwestern reasoning, the Supreme Court's
rationale in Nemitz contains no mention of section 5(11) or of
ICA pre-emption of the RLA. The Court's silence in this regard
may be explained by two considerations.
First, section 5 (11) qualifies the "exclusive and plenary" grant of
97436 F.2d at 845.
98 For an excellent discussion of the deliberately protracted "major" dispute proce-
dures of the RLA, see the Court's opinion in Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Jack-
sonville Terminal, 394 U.S. 369 (1969).
S9 Brief of Respondents at 60-67, Norfolk & W. R.R. v. Nemitz, 404 U.S. 37
(1971).
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authority therein by the limiting proviso that such power exists to
the extent "necessary to enable [the parties] to carry into effect the
transaction so approved or provided for in accordance with the terms
and conditions, if any, imposed by the Commission .. " Since two
of the questions raised in Nemitz were whether the ICC imposed any
protective conditions in the first place, and further, whether federal
court jurisdiction under the ICA was necessary to carry the ICC's
order into effect, the Supreme Court may have perceived that reliance
on section 5 (11) would, in some degree at least, have required it to
beg the questions before it.
Secondly, the Court may have been reluctant to couch its deci-
sion in terms of preemption for fear of opening a Pandora's box.
Northwestern indicates that some agreements provide for arbitra-
tion as a remedy for disputes. As noted above, pre-merger agreements
deal with transitional rules and conditions as well as merger protec-
tion.100 Both Northwestern and Nemitz clearly focused on areas in
which ICA preemption is appropriate. It is doubtful, however, that
a similar conclusion is warranted so far as resolution of grievances
arising out of interpretations or applications of transitional work
rules is concerned. Opening the doors of federal courts to such
grievances would not only prove burdensome to the courts, but
would interfere as well with the ongoing efforts of rail unions and
management to solve workaday grievances within the industry. The
Court could, of course, have drawn a distinction between those mat-
ters necessarily within the preemptive scope of section 5(11) and
those matters which should be excluded - grievances arising out of
interpretations of transitional work rules, for example. In any
event, this distinction is probably implicit in the Nemitz rationale,
and it seems likely that courts will not hesitate to make it explicit
where they are asked to intervene in disputes which do not create
the risk of frustrating the fundamental purposes of the ICA.
This discussion has sought to determine whether, on balance, the
gains from broadening the scope of the ICC's statutory responsibilities
and federal court jurisdiction in the area of rail merger protection
outweighs the disadvantages of limited interference with collective
bargaining and the grievance procedures of the Railway Labor Act.
The conclusion reached is that the gains considerably outweigh the
costs. Collective bargaining is left virtually free to function as a
means of solving merger related labor problems, limited only by the
minimal protective requirements of the ICA. The interests of dis-
100 See text accompanying notes 72-74 supra.
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placed and financially distressed rail employees in timely and full
merger protection is thereby placed beyond the vagaries of internal
union politics, the risks of compromise, and the delays inherent in
the grievance procedures of the RLA.
b. Collective Agreements Reached Subsequent To Rail Merg-
ers.- Nemitz also presented the courts with important questions of
first impression concerning the extent to which agreements subse-
quent to mergers may alter or modify the level of ICC-ordered merg-
er protection. Such subsequent agreements, generally referred to in
the industry as "implementing agreements," deal with a wide range
of problems incident to effectuating consolidations. In some cases,
problems unanticipated or overlooked during pre-merger negotia-
tions are the subject of such agreements. 10 1 On occasion they deal
with problems deliberately deferred to post-merger stages.102 Un-
questionably such agreements are necessary and courts have consis-
tently treated grievances arising out of alleged misapplications of
subsequent agreements as contract disputes which under federal law
must be submitted to the NRAB or, where appropriate, to arbitra-
tion under the contract. 1 3 Where such agreements, however, pur-
port to lessen the level of ICC-ordered merger protection, the
question is whether such agreements sufficiently contravene the pro-
tective objectives of the ICA to be held unenforceable. Numerous
courts have had opportunities to address themselves to this question
prior to Nemitz.1'0 The courts in these cases, however, simply as-
sumed, sometimes gratuitously,'05 that the subsequent agreement was
in compliance with the statute and proceeded to consider whether
this provision of the statute permitted the carrier and the union to
change the ICC order. All of these cases held that it did.
As the district court pointed out, however, "the ability to entirely
101 In the merger involved in Nemitz, for example, the pre-merger agreement did
not include a formula for making adjustments in merger benefits as a result of a "de-
cine in the volume of traffic or revenues." Subsequent to the merger an implementing
agreement was executed providing for such a formula. See Appendix to record, vol. 1,
at 85-89, Norfolk & W. R.R. v. Nemitz, 404 U.S 37 (1971). See also note 72 supra.
102 See, e.g., implementing agreements discussed in Arnold v. Louisville & N. R.R.,
180 F. Supp. 429 (M.D. Tenn. 1960), aff'd sub nor. Batts v. Louisville & N. R.R.,
316 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1963).
'
0 3 See O'Mara v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 407 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1969); Roberts
v. Lehigh & New England R.R., 323 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1963); Flaherty v. Kansas, 0.
& G. R.R., 252 F. Supp. 736 (E.D. Okla. 1966); Arnold v. Louisville & N. R.R., 180
F. Supp. 429 (M.D. Tenn. 1960), aff'd sub nom. Batts v. Louisville & N. R.R., 316
F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1963).
104 E.g., O'Mara v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 407 F.2d 674, 677 (2d Cir. 1969).
105 Id. See Flaherty v. Kansas 0. & G. R.R., 252 F. Supp. 736, 740 (E.D. Okla.
1966).
1972]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24: 103
rewrite the protective agreement does not necessarily imply the
ability to lessen the Congressionally established minimum protec-
tion."' 6  In Nemitz, the courts met the problem of post-merger
contractual reduction of merger benefits head-on. On this issue the
court of appeals relied, as did the district court, on Arnold v. Louis-
ville & Nashville R.R. °' Arnold involved a suit by railroad em-
ployees seeking damages for breach of the protective provisions al-
legedly included in an ICC order authorizing a merger. Subsequent
to merger the unions and management, pursuant to the "notwith-
standing" proviso of section 5(2)(f), had reached an agreement
intended to supplement the ICC order. The implementing agree-
ment provided for a lump sum settlement formula, under the
conditions108 imposed by the ICC, for employees whose jobs were
eliminated by the merger. The discharged employees sued for en-
forcement of their lump sum benefits claiming, as did the plaintiffs
in Nemitz, that jurisdiction existed to enforce an ICC order.
Arnold held that the parties could reach a subsequent agreement
which accomplished the purpose of "adopting, supplementing, or
implementing" the provisions of an ICC protective order. There
the court found that the implementing agreement met this test; but
since the plaintiffs' rights emanated from the subsequent rather
than the prior agreement, the court dismissed on the grounds that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.0 9
Although the employees' claim was dismissed in Arnold, the
case implicitly recognized that subsequent agreements dealing with
merger protection may be scrutinized by courts to assure that they
do not frustrate the protective policy under section 5 (2) (f) toward
adversely affected employees. In Nemitz, the district court adopted
the Arnold dictum and held that a subsequent agreement "can alter,
supplement, or vary the ICC order so long as it does not abridge
the protection afforded by the statute or the ICC order." 10 Regard-
ing the permissible limits of variation from the statutory norm of
protection, the court enunciated the following standard:
[A]n agreement may in changing the protective benefits lessen the
protection as to certain classes of employees, without really altering
the total level of protection. The courts should view such diminu-
106 309 F. Supp. at 584.
107 180 F. Supp. 429 (M.D. Tenn. 1960), aff'd sub nora. Batts v. Louisville & N.
R.R., 316 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1963).
1
0 8 See Oklahoma Ry. Trustees Abandonment, 257 I.C.C. 177 (1944).
109 180 F. Supp. at 433-34.
110 309 F. Supp. at 584.
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tion of protective benefits with disfavor and such should only be
permitted to stand if, when viewed in light of the entire scheme of
protection as modified by the agreement in question, the diminution
is benign. 1 '
Both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court, with slight
embellishment, adopted the Arnold dictum by holding that "[aln
agreement made pursuant to the last sentence of section 5(2) (f)
may vary the protections afforded by the ICC order, but it may not
substantially abrogate employees' rights grounded in an ICC or-
der."11 2 Neither court, however, mentioned the district court's "be-
nign test," thus leaving some doubt as to its vitality. In any event,
this test may prove helpful in applying the nebulous standard of
"substantial abrogation" adopted by the higher courts.
It seems clear that the courts will continue to scrutinize the sub-
stance of subsequent agreements which purport to alter the level of
employee merger protection. The result should be salutary. Po-
tential judicial scrutiny should tend to make basic merger protec-
tion unavailable as a "bargaining chip" to either unions or manage-
ment in their continuing collective efforts to solve labor problems
in post-merger stages. Rather than downgrading collective bargain-
ing,"3 this limited judicial supervision helps circumscribe the boun-
daries within which post-merger collective bargaining is to function
while assuring that the protective purposes of the ICA are not nulli-
fied by the collective bargaining process.
C. Exhaustion of Remedies
In response to problems in the administration of conflicting
claims by unions and carriers, the ICC added to its protective condi-
tions a provision for the settlement of such disputes."' The provi-
sion, which first appeared in 1962 in the Southern Control case,'"
was patterned after the Washington Agreement and provides that
any dispute or controversy arising from protection offered by ICC-
imposed merger conditions or from their interpretation, application,
or enforcement, which cannot be settled within 30 days after a dis-
pute arises, "may be referred" by either party to an arbitration com-
M Id. at 584 n.6.
112 Norfolk & W. R.Rv. Nemitz, 404 U.S. 37,44 (1971).
"13 See id. at 45-52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
114 This modification was made by the ICC in the New Orleans Conditions and in-
cluded a provision respecting settlement of disputes. See note 22 supra.
315 317 I.C.C. 557 (1962), affd on reconsideration, 317 I.C.C. 729 (1963).
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mittee for consideration and determination." 6  Generally, collective
agreements made pursuant to the third sentence of section 5 (2) (f),
whether reached prior1 ' or subsequent 18 to mergers, have included
an arbitration clause patterned after that contained in the Washing-
ton Agreement.
The "may be referred" language in arbitration provisions has
given rise to conflicting judicial interpretations among the federal
circuit courts. One line of authorities holds that under the "may"
clause, arbitration is an optional remedy until such time as one of the
parties to the contract invokes it, in which event the remedy becomes
mandatory." 9 At least one circuit has interpreted the "may" lan-
guage more restrictively. In Bonnet v. Congress of Independent
Unions Local 14,120 Judge Blackmun of the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that "[tQhe obvious purpose of the 'may' language is
to give the aggrieved party the choice between arbitration and aban-
donment of its claim.' 121 Since individual employees do not have
the right to invoke arbitration, the "may" language assumes crucial
importance in the event the union refuses to pursue the employee's
grievance. It was this situation which confronted the courts in
Nemitz. There the union refused to take the employees' claims to
arbitration as provided for in the pre-merger protective agreement.
Citing the union's refusal to press the employees' claims, the car-
rier advanced a two-pronged argument against federal court juris-
diction over the case. The carrier urged the court to adopt, in the
interest of promoting orderly administration of collective agree-
ments, the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of the "may" clause: that
the union's refusal to arbitrate barred the employees from pursuing
their claims further. 22  Secondly, the carrier argued that the Su-
preme Court's decision in Vaca v. Sipes2S dictates that the employ-
ees cannot sue a carrier in the face of union refusal to exhaust
1161d. at 590.
117 See note 25 supra.
118 See note 103 supra.
119 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & 1. R.R., 353 U.S. 30
(1957); New Orleans & N.E. R.R. v. Bozeman, 312 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1963); Parsons
v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 310 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D. W. Va. 1970); Arnold v. Louisville &
N. R.R., 180 F. Supp. 429 (M.D. Tenn. 1960), aff'd sub nom. Batts v. Louisville & N.
R.R., 316 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1963).
120 331 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1964).
121 Id. at 359.
122 Id.
123 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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available grievance procedures, without a showing that the union had
breached its duty of fair representation.
The railroad's contentions presented the courts with questions of
broad significance within what is generally described as the exhaus-
tion of remedies doctrine. In recent years this doctrine has been
the focus of considerable attention in the Supreme Court. The re-
suiting decisions have had a great influence on an important area of
federal labor law which is often poorly understood by courts and
practitioners alike. What follows is a sketch of the contours of both
the rule and the major court-developed exceptions to its application.
An attempt is made to assess the impact of recent Court decisions
on the exhaustion rule and to examine Nemitz against the back-
ground of recent developments in federal labor law policy.
1. Exhaustion of Union Remedies: The Rule.- As a general
rule, an employee seeking a remedy for alleged violations of a col-
lective agreement is required to show that he has exhausted his reme-
dies under the contract before seeking judicial intervention. This
rule,124 which is analogous to the rule requiring exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies as a condition precedent to resorting to the courts' 25
is premised on a need for practical machinery to resolve the myriad
problems arising under a collective bargaining agreement. Adherence
to the rule makes possible settlement of disputes by an expeditious,
orderly and inexpensive procedure before persons intimately familiar
with industry problems. Moreover, use of contract remedies tends to
foster more harmonious employee-employer relations. 26 Outside the
RLA, the courts have uniformly barred access to judicial relief where
an employee has not taken even the initial step of requesting the proc-
essing of his grievance. The Supreme Court, however, early carved
out an important exception in cases arising under the RLA. In
12 4 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379
U.S. 650 (1965); Transcontinental & Western Air v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653 (1953) (ap-
plying Missouri law); Wallace v. Southern Pac., 106 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
125 For the most parr, the courts treat the exhaustion of remedies questions in these
two categories identically. While similar policy considerations generally underly both
rules, courts have occasionally recognized differences in the procedures attending the
two rules. See, e.g., Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 657 n.14 (1965). But
see Andrews v. Louisville & N. R.R., 406 U.S. 320 (1972). Andrews may have re-
moved the last vestiges of distinction between the two rules in federal labor law. As
used in this article, the phrase "exhaustion of remedies" refers to both rules.
The related, but somewhat different rule requiring exhaustion of internal union
remedies before seeking judicial relief is discussed in text accompanying notes 144-52
infra.
126 For a good description of the objectives served by the rule, see Cone v. Union
Oil Co., 129 Cal. App. 2d 558, 277 P. 2d 464 (2d Dist Ct App. 1954).
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Moore v. Illinois Central R. R.,127 the Court held that a trainman
was not required by the RLA to exhaust the administrative remedies
accorded him by the Act before bringing suit for wrongful dis-
charge under state law. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Black
based the decision on the use of permissive language in the Act -
disputes "may be referred ... to the ...Adjustment Board."12
The Court's rationale is doubled edged. First, the Court concluded
that Congress had intended the procedures for adjustment of "minor
disputes" under the RLA129 to be optional, not compulsory, and that
hence states should be free to agree on an alternative remedy for a
discharged railroad employee based on local contract law. Second,
the Court reasoned that application of the federal labor law exhaus-
tion policies is not warranted when an employee chooses to end the
employment relationship, since no further danger of industrial strife
exists. The basic holding of Moore was reaffirmed and its state law
aspects amplified in Transcontinental & Western Airlines v. Kop-
pal.'3" Koppal held that if state law requires an employee to ex-
haust administrative remedies provided for in his employment con-
tract before suing in the state courts, a federal diversity court should
enforce that requirement.13'
The Moore rule, however, was hardly ensconced in the pantheon
of Supreme Court pronouncements before its immortality was in
doubt. The first evidence of its pending demise came when the
Court refused to apply the Moore rationale in cases under the RLA
involving claims of employees, not for damages for wrongful dis-
charge, but for -additional compensation" and for "reinstate-
ment.' '132 In Walker v. Southern Ry.,'33 the Court observed: "Pro-
vision for arbitration of a discharge grievance, a minor dispute, is not
a matter of voluntary agreement under the Railway Labor Act; the
Act compels the parties to arbitrate minor disputes before the Na-
tional Railroad Board established under the Act."' 34  While Walker
is distinguishable from Moore in that the employees there, rather
than severing their employment and proceeding under state contract
127312 U.S. 630 (1941).
1281d. at 635.
129 See text accompanying note 79 supra.
130 345 U.S. 653 (1953).
131 Id. at 661.
132 See Walker v. Southern R.R., 385 U.S. 196 (1966); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v.
Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682 (1963); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago
River & I. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
133 385 U.S. 196 (1966).
134 Id. at 198.
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law, chose to base their claims on the collective agreements, subse-
quent decisions did little to stem the erosion of Moore.
In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, 35 the
Court said an agreement required under section 204 of the RLA was
"like the Labor Management Relations Act Sec. 301 contract... a
federal contract and . . . therefore governed and enforceable by
federal law, in the federal courts."' 36  In Republic Steel Corp. v.
Maddox, 37 the Court not only refused to extend Moore to save state
court actions for breach of contract under section 301 of the LMRA,
but also strongly intimated that its rule might well not survive even
in RLA cases. 8 The Court, however, was not presented with a clear
opportunity to overrule Moore until the October 1971 term of court.
In Andrews v. Louisville & N. R.R.,3 9 a railroad employee brought
a suit in a Georgia state court seeking damages, as had the employee
in Moore, for alleged wrongful discharge by the railroad. The Su-
preme Court rejected the Moore distinction between election to sever
the employment relationship and sue under state law, and election to
proceed under the RLA on the basis of misapplication of the collec-
tive agreement. "[T~he only source of petitioner's right not to be
discharged, and therefore to treat an alleged discharge as a 'wrong-
ful' one that entitles [the employee] to damages, is the collective
bargaining agreement between the employer and the union."'"4  In
laying Moore to rest the court abserved: "[TJhe notion that the
grievance and arbitration procedures provided for in minor disputes
in the Railway Labor Act are optional, to be availed of as the em-
ployee or the carrier chooses, was never good history and is no longer
good law."'' With Andrews the Court thus made it plain that in
any case where an employee sues on a collective agreement governed
by federal law,'42 the failure to at least attempt use of available ad-
135 372 U.S. 682 (1963).
136 Id. at 692.
13 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
138Id. at 657 n.14.
139 406 U.S. 320 (1972).
140 Id. at 324.
141 Id. at 322.
142 The leading case establishing the extent to which suits on collective bargaining
agreements are governed by federal law is Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills
of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Lincoln Mills established the rule that § 301 of the La-
bor Management Relations Act requires the judiciary to develop a federal substantive
law of collective bargaining agreements derived from the provisions and policies of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), general legal principles, and other appropriate
sources. As the cases discussed in this article indicate, the Lincoln Mills rationale has
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ministrative remedies or contract grievance procedures will bar judi-
cial intervention in the dispute.
A tougher question, however, is presented where an employee
has presented his grievance to a union which has refused to press it
further or has failed to handle it to his complete satisfaction. Cases
involving union unwillingness to press a grievant's claim confront
the courts with the task of reconciling two sometimes antagonistic
policy considerations. On the one hand, to allow each individual
employee to overrule the governing body of a union by compelling
it to press the grievance, would create a condition of disorder and
instability which would be disastrous to labor as well as industry.
Similarly, to bestow upon individual employees the unqualified alter-
native of seeking judicial relief would defeat the related objectives
of lessening the burden on the courts and of promoting the likeli-
hood of uniform interpretations and applications of the contract
within the industry. On the other hand, however, the courts have
recognized that strict application of the exhaustion requirement
would frequently result in hardship, oppression, and injustice. This
recognition has prompted the courts to make exceptions which have
substantially qualified the exhaustion rule. An understanding of
these exceptions is necessary for an understanding of the rule.
2. Exhaustion of Union Remedies: Exceptions.- For purposes
of discussion, it is helpful to break the cases dealing with excep-
tions to the exhaustion rule into two broad categories. First,
there are cases in which the employee, for one reason or an-
other, has failed to exhaust internal union remedies in his efforts to
get the union to pursue his claim through available grievance pro-
cedures. This category of cases brings into play the rule, analogous
to the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, that a union
member may not invoke the aid of the courts until all appeals within
the union have been exhausted. While this rule applies most often
to an employee who is seeking judicial relief against union-imposed
discipline - an area outside the scope of this article - it is some-
times invoked by the courts in cases where an employee is frustrated
by the union's appellate process in his efforts to prevail upon the
union to press his claim against the employer.143 The second cate-
been extended to cover the RLA area. For an excellent in-depth analysis of Lincoln
Mills, see Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1959).
143 For an interesting illustration of how the courts tend to blur the distinction
between the exhaustion of remedies rule and the somewhat different problem of re-
quiring exhaustion of internal union remedies, compare the discussion of the Court in
Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 329-31 (1969) with that of the
circuit court in Nemitz v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 436 F.2d 841, 848 (6th Cir. 1971).
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gory of exceptions involves cases in which the employee has ex-
hausted his internal union remedies and the union has either refused
to press his grievance or has for some reason, chosen to abandon,
compromise or otherwise dispose of the claim in a manner unsatisfac-
tory to the grievant. The following is a brief attempt to delineate
the exceptions within these two broad categories.
Where an employee has failed to exhaust internal union reme-
dies, the courts have fashioned several well established exceptions
to the exhaustion rule. First, even though an appeal is immediate-
ly available, a court will not require a member to perform the futile
gesture of filing such an appeal when it is clear that it will be de-
nied. Thus, in Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.,' 44 where black
railway carmen sought judicial relief from racial discrimination by
the carrier and union in the matter of promotions and the railroad
sought dismissal because, among other reasons, the carmen had
failed to exhaust their remedies under the union constitution, the
Supreme Court declared that it would be futile for the black carmen
to seek relief from those against whom their complaint was made .1 5
Similarly, exhaustion of appeals has been excused where the persons
hearing the appeal are the very officers against whom the members'
complaints are directed.' 46
The usefulness of this exception will often hinge upon the will-
ingness of the courts to recognize the realities of union politics.
'Where appellate procedures of a union are but successive links in a
single political chain of control, to avoid injustice the courts should
be willing to probe underlying realities before denying an employee
access to judicial relief.
Second, most unions provide for at least two steps in the ap-
pellate procedure, including appeals to the international executive
board.'47 Courts have recognized, in a variety of cases, that if
144 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
14 5 1d. at 329-31.
'
46 Not all courts, however, have been willing to accord official recognition to the
realities of union politics. In the extreme case of Hall v. Morrin, 293 S.W. 435 (Mo.
App. 1927), a member of the International Association of Bridge and Structural Iron
Workers was charged with slandering the international officers, and found guilty by a
tribunal consisting of President Morrin and another officer. The court held that he
must take his appeal to the executive board which consisted of Morrin and eight mem-
bers he had appointed. While Morrin presented a case factually dissimilar from the
cases in this article, the case is cited by way of suggesting the importance, at least in
some cases, of distinguishing between the rule requiring exhaustion of union remedies
and that requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies.
147The Union procedures in Nemitz are described in Appendix to record vol. 1,
at 131-50, Norfolk & Western R.R. v. Nemitz, 404 U.S. 37(1971).
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exhaustion of union appeals would create too great a delay, an
employee may have immediate access to the courts. 4 ' While the
cases differ on what constitutes unreasonable delay, the better rea-
soned cases have attempted to measure the reasonableness of delay
by the hardship involved. 49 Here again the fairest results have
come in cases where the courts have given official recognition to the
internal workings of unions.
Third, it is well established that in actions against unions for
alleged wrongful conduct, a member who seeks damages rather than
reinstatement, or whose property rights are involved, need not ex-
haust his internal union remedies.'50 By the same token, if the com-
plained-of union proceedings are void - for example, where the
union official who conducted the proceeding had no jurisdiction over
the matter - the disciplined member need not exhaust his internal
appeals.' 5'
While these three exceptions to the rule have generally been ap-
plied in union discipline cases, they are useful to the present discussion
for two reasons. First, the courts have tended to blur the distinc-
tion between exceptions to the rule under discussion and the exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies rule.'52 This tendency has probably
resulted in large measure from the fact that cases arising under
both rules present the courts with the problem of protecting em-
ployees against abuses in procedures over which they often have
little, if any, control. Second, as will be presently pointed out,
the whole area of exceptions to the administrative remedies rule has,
at least in federal labor law cases, been thrown into a state of flux
by recent Supreme Court pronouncements. These utterances, while
apparently restricting the scope of employee protection against
abuses of the grievance system in some areas, have also given clear
indication that the Court recognizes a need for continued develop-
ment of protection in other areas. It, therefore, seems likely that the
courts and practitioners will find the rationale of many decisions in
this category of exceptions useful in working out the boundaries of
employee protection under federal labor law.
148 Note, Protection for Employees Adversely Affected by Railway Mergers: Nor-
folk & Western Railway Co. v. Nemitz, 13 ARIz. L. REV. 703, 712-15 (1971).
149 Compare the reasoning and results reached in Painters Local 57 v. Boyd, 245 Ala.
227, 16 So. 2d 705 (1944) with those in Snay v. Lovely, 276 Mass. 159, 176 N.E. 791
(1931).
150 Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1961);
Local 65, Amalgamated S.M.W.I.A. v. Nalty, 7 F.2d 100, 101 (6th Cir. 1925).
151 See Simmons v. Textile Workers Local 713, 350 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1965).
15 2 See note 143 supra.
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A more difficult problem is presented where the union has failed
to dispose of a claim to the satisfaction of the grievant, than where an
employee's failure to exhaust his internal union remedies is raised as
a defense. In the latter cases, courts have had little difficulty in
perceiving, as the Supreme Court did in Glover v. St. Louis-San Fran-
cisco Ry.,"'5 that a rule designed to obviate the need for judicial in-
tervention in union affairs should not be applied so as to shield the
employer from the consequences of alleged misapplication of a
collective agreement. In the former cases, however, the courts are
confronted with the problem of protecting the interests of individual
employees Without doing violence to the integrity of the contract or
administrative grievance procedures. Much of the trouble in this
area has resulted from a failure to evolve an intelligible theory upon
which to base objective discussion of the values and policies involved
and to fashion standards to be applied.
In searching for workable limitations and exceptions to the ex-
haustion of remedies requirement, the courts have evolved two basic
approaches. The first approach has been to develop protection for
the individual through.evolution and implementation of the union's
fiduciary duty of fair representation. A second approach has been
to fashion exceptions, often 'analogous to those developed to excuse
exhaustion of internal union remedies, under which an employee
may be excused from failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
In the landmark case of Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,'54
Chief Justice Stone held that the statutory bargaining representative
has a duty "to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf
of all those for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against
them."' 5  The case arose under the RLA but later decisions estab-
lished that the NLRA imposes a similar obligation. "' Although
Steele involved racial discrimination, the duty of equal representa-
tion has been extended to prevent other forms of discriminatory
conduct. 7
It is the view of the author, however, that the vitality of fair rep-
resentation suits as a source of individual employee protection has
been seriously eroded by the much discussed case of Vaca v. Sipes.'58
153 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
'54 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
155 Id. at 203.
156 See Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892, rev'g per curiam, 223 F.2d
739 (5th Cir. 1955).
157 See Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945).
158 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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In Vaca, an employee successfully sued his union for monetary dam-
ages in a state court alleging that the union had breached its duty
of fair representation. The union had commenced processing an
employee's claim that he had been wrongfully discharged for medi-
cal reasons. However, after the fourth of five possible steps in the
grievance procedure, the union obtained medical information which
caused it to conclude that there was insufficient medical evidence to
warrant pressing the employee's claim to the final step. In reversing
the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court, the Court declared that
more was required than a showing that the underlying grievance
was meritorious, and that in the situation presented in Vaca, an em-
ployee is precluded from bringing a judicial action against either the
union or the employer in the absence of a showing that the union's
refusal to take the matter to arbitration was arbitrary, discrimina-
tory, or in bad faith.'59 The Court also held that the lower court
judgment could not stand: since the employer had not been joined
as a defendant, and the employee's claim was for wrongful breach
of the collective bargaining agreement, there was no reason to ex-
empt the employer from contractual damages or to impose the hard-
ship of paying damages on the union. 6"
Vaca has produced its progeny. For instance, in De Arroyo v.
Sindicata De Trabajadores Packing,'6' the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals considered whether employees can sue their employer for
breach of contract despite their union's refusal to exhaust a grievance
procedure which gave the union control of the procedure and per-
mitted it to abandon a grievance without exhausting that procedure.
The Court held that an employee cannot properly sue his employer
in the face of a union refusal to exhaust a grievance procedure, ab-
sent an arbitrary refusal. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reached the same result in Boone v. Armstrong Cork Company."6 2
It is submitted that Vaca, for several reasons, raises serious ques-
tions concerning the future misuse of grievance machinery by unions
and misapplication of collective agreements by employers. First, the
rationale of the decision seems to assign a greater value to protect-
ing the union's "discretion to supervise the grievance machinery"
than it does to protecting the interests of employees against abuses of
that same machinery. Assuming that overburdened courts will con-
159 Id. at 190.
160 Id. at 195-96.
161 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
162 384 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1967).
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tinue to welcome justifications for narrowing rather than broadening
the scope of their jurisdiction, it is likely that the courts will continue
to view Vaca as persuasive authority for dismissing many employee
suits on the ground that an employee is barred by union failure to
exhaust available grievance procedures. Secondly, even in the
strongest cases, the Vaca rationale places an extremely heavy burden
of proof on the employee seeking to establish a breach of the union's
duty. Requiring the employee to go beyond a showing that his
claim is meritorious and to prove arbitrariness, discrimination, or
bad faith - standards which are at best nebulous and difficult to
demonstrate objectively - will often prove an impossible task for
the aggrieved employee. Moreover, since the gist of the employee's
grievance will be that the employer breached the collective agree-
ment, the employee's difficulties of proof will be compounded by
the fact that it will generally be in the interest of the employer to
side with the union.
While Vaca may arguably have diminished the usefulness of fair
representation suits as a basis of employee protection against union
abuses of grievance machinery, the Court in that case clearly recog-
nized that in some cases exceptions to the exhaustion rule are neces-
sary to protect the interests of employees.0 3 The Vaca Court out-
lined at least one situation in which an employee could sue despite
his failure to fully exhaust contractual remedies, namely, where the
employer's conduct amounts to a repudiation of the contractual pro-
cedures.164  In a later case the Court described another exception:
"where the effort to proceed formally with contractual or adminis-
trative remedies would be wholly futile."' 63  As previously noted,
these Supreme Court rulings have contributed to a developing body
of federal court exceptions to the exhaustion of remedies require-
ment. 66
163 Regarding contract grievance procedures the Court observed:
[B]ecause these contractual remedies have been devised and are often con-
trolled by the union and the employer, they may well prove unsatisfactory or
unworkable for the individual grievant The problem then is to determine
under what circumstances the individual employee may obtain judicial review
of his breach-of-contract daim despite his failure to secure relief through
the contractual remedial procedures.
386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967).
164 Id.
165 Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 330 (1969).
166 See text accompanying notes 144-52 supra. Some courts have suggested that
the exceptions have successfully swallowed the exhaustion of remedies rule. See, e.g.,
Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cit. 1961). See also
Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J.
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In sum, while the Supreme Court has recognized that potential
abuses of grievance machinery require development of effective coun-
terfoils to strict applicatioa of the exhaustion of remedies rule, it
has also indicated that the contours of such protection will have to
be worked out on a. case-by-case basis. It was against this back-
ground that the courts in Nemitz confronted the exhaustion issue.
3. The Nemitz Response.- The pre-merger protective agree-
ment in Npmitz included a clause stating that grievances "may
be referred" to arbitration. 67 The employees had taken every pos-
sible step, including an appeal to the national executive board of
their union, in an unsuccessful effort to have the union proceed to
arbitration with their claims. The lower courts, on alternative
grounds, ruled in favor of the employees on the exhaustion issue.
First, they found that the employees had fulfilled all possible require-
ments for exhaustion of remedies by pursuing every available avenue
in an attempt to have arbitration invoked.168 Second, the courts
adopted the interpretation o the "may" clause which holds that ar-
bitration is not required unless union or management invokes it, and,
since neither had invoked arbitration, it was not required.
In the Supreme Court, the railroad renewed its contention that
the employees' failure to exhaust should bar federal court jurisdic-
tion over the case.169 However, in affirming the judgment of the
court of appeals, the Court failed to address itself to the exhaustion
problem. The Supreme Court's failure in this regard is disappoint-
ing for at least two reasons. Nemitz presented the Court with a
clear opportunity to resolve the conflict among the circuits on the
interpretation of the standard "may" language in arbitration
clauses. ° Resolving this conflict would have removed a source of
uncertainty which is likely to remain troublesome both to contract-
ing parties and to the courts. More importantly, perhaps, the
Court's election to not confront the exhaustion issue leaves unre-
solved a number of perplexing problems which frequently arise in
mergers.
First, as a prerequisite to judicial enforcement of their rights,
must employees exhaust their internal union remedies in an effort to
175, 207-10 (1960); Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 HARV.
L. REV. 609, 614-15 (1959).
167436 F.2d 841, 848 (6th Cir. 1971).
168 Id. at 848.
169 Brief for Petitioner, at 53-61, Norfolk & W. R.R. v. Nemitz, 404 U.S. 37
(1971).
170 See notes 119-21 supra & accompanying text.
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get their union to arbitrate? In Nemitz nearly two years had elapsed
by the time the employees had exhausted all internal union ap-
peals. 1 ' Thus the courts were presented with a factually easy case.
By implying, however, that the exhaustion of internal union reme-
dies rule applies to employee actions to enforce merger rights, 172
Nemitz also suggests the related question of whether, and under
what circumstances, adversely affected employees will be excused
from compliance with this rule. Should not financially distressed
employees, for example, be excused from strict compliance with the
rule in cases where the delays attending exhaustion of union appellate
procedures will frustrate the protective purposes of the ICA? On
the other hand, where the employee's grievance grows out of an
alleged misapplication of a transitional work rule, are not different
considerations of policy involved?
Second, where, as in Nemitz, there is evidence that a merger has
seriously weakened the position of a group of employees within their
own union,173 or that the union is unwilling to press the employees'
claims because of indifference, discrimination, or unwillingness to
suffer the expense, should not the courts look past the exhaustion
rule to the special risks to employee interests created by the disrup-
tive effects of mergers? In other words, should situations such as
that presented in Nemitz be treated by the courts as "just another"
exhaustion of remedies problem, or should the courts attempt to
identify the special interests and problems involved in such cases,
and to fashion appropriate concepts for dealing with them?
Third, would the result have been different in Nemitz if the
union, rather than refusing to arbitrate, had proceeded to arbitration
but had either abandoned the claim prior to completing arbitration,
or had compromised the claims in a manner unsatisfactory to the
employees? Under such circumstances, would the Vaca rule have
prevented the employees, however meritorious their claim, from
maintaining their suit, absent a showing that the union's conduct
was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith? If so, would Vaca
171 See note 82 supra.
17 2 The distric court noted, for example, that the employees had "reached a dead end
street in their attempts to utilize internal union remedies." 287 F. Supp. at 230. Sim-
ilarly, the Supreme Court in Glover, discussed at note 144 supra, implied that this rule
applied to the situation of the black carmen. 393 U.S. at 329. There, of course, the
Court went on to hold that requiring exhaustion of either union, contract, or administra-
tive remedies would be futile so far as the carmen were concerned. More to the point
of our discussion, however, is that the opinion in Glover evinces a lack of recognition
on the part of the Court of any distinction between the requirements of the rules
governing exhaustion of these three avenues of redress.
173 287 F. Supp. at 230.
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require the employees to join the union and employer as defen-
dants; and, assuming the employees did so successfully, is the pos-
sibility of requiring a union to pay such a judgment from funds
made up, partly at least, from dues collected from aggrieved em-
ployees compatible with the policy objectives of either the ICA or
the RLA?
Fourth, do the foregoing problems and considerations in the area
of employee merger protection indicate the need for developing
remedies beyond those considered in Nemitz? Should, for example,
individual employees be permitted, in some cases, to invoke arbitra-
tion in the face of union refusal to do SO, 174 or to compel their
union through injunction to process their claim? Would not such
alternatives, in some cases - where court docket congestion requires
several years delay before hearing, for example:-- be preferable to
judicial enforcement?
The foregoing observations are intended to be merely suggestive
of questions which the Nemitz decision leaves unresolved. In the
final analysis, the failure of the courts in Nemitz to deal more effec-
tively with the exhaustion of remedies questions is probably the re-
sult of neglect by the courts - notably the Supreme Court - to
formulate intelligible theories from which to rationalize both the
applications of the exhaustion rule and its limitations. This failure
has strewn the exhaustion area with examples of decision making at
two extremes. At one extreme are decisions placed upon narrow
grounds of interpretation or procedural irregularities which frequent-
ly obscure the real reason for granting protection. At the other
extreme, are obviously result-oriented decisions, commendably long
on perception of injustice and lamentably short on reasons for cur-
ing it.
V. CONCLUSION
Not through misguided action, but rather through a continua-
tion of neglect, the Supreme Court in Nemitz has failed to remedy
confusing uncertainties in the exhaustion area which will continue
to foster piecemeal and unenlightening lower court decisions at the
expense of cohesive federal labor policy. The actions the Court
did take, however, are sound and are firmly based on the practical
174 The courts might work out a rationale whereby the employees would be per-
mitted to recover, in addition to damages, costs and attorneys fees. While this proce-
dure might hasten payment of claims to financially distressed employees at the time
they most need protection, it would also have the disadvantage of inviting conflicting
adjudications.
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needs of the railroad industry rather than on the uncertain signposts
of an ambiguous legislative history. In broadening the scope of
the ICC's statutory responsibilities as well as the federal courts'
jurisdiction in rail merger protection, the Court has substantially
furthered the job security of rail employees, while limiting the
processes of collective bargaining only by the minimal protective
requirements of the ICA. The gains produced in Nemitz thus sub-
stantially outweigh any possible cost of a limited governmental
interference into bargaining and grievance procedures.
